G5 Sahel Joint Force: A3+1 Statement

Mr. President

I would like, on behalf of the A3+1, namely, Kenya, Tunisia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, and Niger, to thank most sincerely, Mr. Jean Pierre Lacroix, Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations, General Oumarou Namata, Commander of the G5 Sahel Joint Force and the Chairman of the Peacebuilding Commission, Mr. Mohamed Idris, for their excellent presentations and for their sustained commitment to the stabilization of the situation in the Sahel.

We also welcome the presence among us today of His Excellency Mr. Chérif Mahamat Zene, Minister of Foreign Affairs, African Integration and Chadians Abroad, whose Country is currently assuming the rotating Presidency of the G5 Sahel.

Mr. Minister, on behalf of the A3+1, I would like to pay tribute to the late President Idriss Deby Itno, whose role and that of Chad are incommensurable in the fight against terrorism in the Sahel.

Mr. President,

I will focus my remarks on two aspects, notably the major factual observations and the recommendations of the A3+1.

First, with regard to the major factual observations:

Today, the link between development and security is clearly demonstrated in the Sahel where these phenomena interact with each other in a feedback loop.

On the security front, the assessment presented in the Secretary General's report and General Namata's presentation depict an appreciable operationalization of the Joint Force. Its military actions have resulted in the neutralization and capture of terrorists and other criminals in its areas of operation. Enormous progress has been made in the area of respect for human rights and international humanitarian law.

The deployment of the 8th Chadian Battalion, consisting of 1,200 elements, bringing the total strength of the Joint Force to 5,534, is already beginning to demonstrate its usefulness in the tri-border area. In addition, there is good coordination between the allied forces on the ground, namely the Joint Force, National Armed Forces and Operation Barkhane. This has disrupted the logistical chains of armed terrorist groups and reduced their numbers, contributing to positive steps towards ensuring the region's stability which is of critical importance.

Parallelly, I would like to acknowledge the invaluable support of the African Union, WAEMU, ECOWAS, France, the European Union, the United States, China, Russia, Senegal, Rwanda, and all other partners who have contributed to the operationalization of the Joint Force through their multiple and multi-faceted support.

The AFRICOM and Barkhane liaison officers within the Joint Force support the Commander on a daily basis.

Also, since its reorganization, the G5 Sahel Executive Secretariat has significantly improved its support to the Joint Force. It has demonstrated its ability to coordinate and monitor the implementation of the cooperation framework between Sahelian states. It has also demonstrated its ability to independently manage its own procurement system.

However, these results have been achieved at the expense of an increased lack of equipment and weak logistical capacity due mainly to underfunding and a delay in the disbursement of promised funds. The evaluation of the Joint Force Support Mechanism noted that the sustainability of the fight against terrorism will depend on predictable and adequate resources.

As a result, despite the progress I have just mentioned, 2020 was the deadliest year for civilians in the tri-border area of Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger, where more than 2,440 civilians as well as defense and security forces lives were lost. In this regard, we stress the need for collective efforts and an integrated approach in combatting this cross-border nature of terrorism whose spread in Africa continues to be a great concern.

Since 2018, in the Liptako-Gourma region, the number of internally displaced persons has increased twentyfold. In the G5 Sahel states, nearly 2.2 million people were internally displaced and more than 880,000 people become refugees.

In addition, intercommunal conflicts exacerbate the complexity of the security situation, including the fight against terrorism. Besides, the adverse effects of climate change also continue to exacerbate the humanitarian situation in the region.

We, therefore, must continue to take into account the complex relationship between climate change and conflict in order to prevent and address the challenges of poverty, food insecurity, and intercommunal violence caused by climate change with a view to creating conditions for peace and reducing the risk of violence.

Also, as part of improving MINUSMA's support to the Joint Force, a number of mechanisms have been put in place, including the use of private companies to deliver support to battalions operating outside Mali.

We are concerned about the 11-month delay in executing those contracts after the adoption of resolution 2531 (2020), but also because, even if executed, this formula would still generate additional costs for the Joint Force as the supplies will not be delivered up to the battalions by private companies.

On the development front, the evolution of the Human Development Index in the world shows that the Sahelian countries, with an average annual growth rate of 1.2% over the last 20 years, exceeded the world average of 0.7% over the same period. Unfortunately, the impact of the COVID 19 pandemic, coupled with the heavy financial cost of territorial defense, has taken a toll on their ability to invest in development sector and basic social services.

Thus, support for the implementation of the Priority Investment Program (PIP) derived from the Strategy for Development and Security (SDS) is more necessary than ever.

In this regard, the A3+1 welcomes the recent appointment of Mr. Abdoulaye Mar Dieye as Special Coordinator for Development in the Sahel and encourages him to strengthen support for the implementation of the United Nations Integrated Strategy for the Sahel (UNISS) in close partnership with UNOWAS, the Sahel Countries, regional Organizations (including the African Union (AU), the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), and the G5 Sahel.

Mr. President,

In light of the above major factual observations, I come to my second point on the A3+1 recommendations:

The imperatives of political and civil "Surge" advocated at the G5 Sahel Summit of Heads of State, held in Ndjamena from February 15 to 16, should be combined with the imperative of development "Surge".

From this perspective, since peace is a global public good, the Security Council and the international community have a moral responsibility not to let the Sahelian dam break.

If this is the objective, we must take into account the Secretary General's constant recommendations, based on evaluations of MINUSMA's support to the Joint Force, by creating next month a UN Support Office for logistical and operational support. This is the only option that would prevent this dam from bursting, when in addition to the growing insecurity faced by the G5 Sahel states, unfortunately two of them are now confronted with internal crisis, the common denominator of which is the situation prevailing in Libya.

On the current enhanced support, for the Joint Force through the use of private companies, the 11-month delay in implementing the new formula is in itself indicative of the shortcomings that it will inevitably entail; moreover, this additional support takes into account only part of the more comprehensive support that would be necessary for the Joint Force.

The amount budgeted for the use of private companies for delivery purpose would have been more useful in equipping the Joint Force logistically so that it can autonomously carry out itself the collections of the supplies.

These facts also militate in favor of setting up the Support Office.

With regard to the recurrence of inter-community conflicts, the establishment of a G5 Sahel/UN Joint Project would significantly help curbing the root causes and preventing the recurrence of such conflicts.

Furthermore, Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) will certainly reinforce collective regional security efforts including steps towards the self-sufficiency of the G5 Sahel Joint Force.

As for the Peacebuilding Commission, its support on Burkina Faso's peacebuilding priorities in 2020 is commendable. We encourage its replication in the rest of G5 Sahel countries, in full coordination with the interested Countries.

In addition, it should collaborate with the Joint Force in the sector of Civil-military co-operation, through quick impact projects proved to foster trust with local populations.

The Commission could also support the Integrated Territorial Management Project (PATI), between municipalities in the Sahel (Burkina Faso), Timbuktu (Mali), and Tillabéri (Niger) regions - home to 5.5 million people - planned for one year and financed to the tune of CFAF $1,84 million by the West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU).

In conclusion, Mr. President, it is time to take stock, in order to evaluate and adjust our intervention strategies. The ball is in the court of the Security Council, which must seize this opportunity to continue to support and assist the Sahel throughout this critical phase of the fight against terrorism.