Syria's Chemical Weapons Programme: A3 Statement

Mr. President,

I have the honour to deliver this statement on behalf of the A3 members comprising Gabon, Kenya and my own country Ghana. Our decision to deliver a joint statement today, stems from our shared commitments to uphold the well-established and internationally accepted norms against the use of chemical weapons and to support efforts geared towards their complete elimination.

We extend our appreciation to the High Representative for Disarmament Affairs, Ms. Izumi Nakamitsu, for the comprehensive briefing. We also take note of the views shared by Mr. Hans von Sponeck, who is the founding member of the BerlinGroup21.

Let me also welcome the participation of the distinguished representatives of the Syrian Arab Republic, The Islamic Republic of Iran and Turkey.

Mr. President,

The A3 acknowledges the role of the OPCW as the key implementing agency for the Chemical Weapons Convention and commends its efforts to complement and strengthen our work in the maintenance of international peace and security.

We welcome the centennial monthly report of the OPCW which outlines the activities undertaken during the period of 24 December 2021 to 23 January 2022, to implement Security Council resolution 2118 (2013) and other relevant decisions of the OPCW Executive Council relating to the elimination of Syrian Chemical Weapons.

With nearly all of its members being State parties to the Chemical weapons Convention, the African continent can be counted upon as a reliable partner in the global efforts against the use of chemical weapons in Africa or anywhere else in the world. Chemical weapons use constitutes a grave violation of international law and puts at risk the peace, security and stability that we so hardly work to obtain. The A3, therefore reiterates Africa's strongly held position against the use of Chemical weapons by anyone, anywhere and under any circumstances.

We further reiterate our firm condemnation of the use of chemical weapons in the name of counter-terrorism.

Mr. President,

The A3 is concerned about the gaps and inconsistencies that remain in Syria's initial and subsequent submissions on its weapons stockpile and urges the Syrian Authorities and the OPCW to work together to resolve all outstanding issues and questions especially related to Syria's initial declaration which remain unresolved 8 years after the adoption of resolution 2118 on the elimination of Syria's chemical weapons programme.

We take note of work of the Technical Secretariat in Syria and the difficult circumstances imposed by the COVID-19 pandemic and encourage the constructive cooperation of the Syrian Arab Republic and all other parties playing an important role in facilitating the effective discharge of the Secretariat's mandate.

We also take note of the activities of the Declaration Assessment Team (DAT) and call upon the Syrian Arab Republic to grant unfettered access into Syria for all members of the team.

Regarding the issue of visas, we encourage the Technical Secretariat to explore alternative approaches for carrying out its verification and assessment mandate. This could include the replacement of the team member to whom access has been withheld or the remote participation of that member in the work of the team. This, we hope, would remove the obstacles to the holding of the twenty-fifth round of consultations between the DAT and the Syrian National Authority and pave the way for verification and assessments in line with the Convention and relevant Executive Council decisions.

We would like to see progress on the subsequent rounds of inspections of the Barzah and Jamrayah facilities of the Syrian Scientific Studies and Research Centre and urge the Syrian authorities to be more cooperative on the conclusion of this issue.

The A3 looks forward to substantive progress being made towards the meeting between Foreign Minister Faisal Mekdad and the Director General of the OPCW as we believe such engagement would be useful for building trust.

Mr. President,

The A3 supports accountability mechanisms for chemical weapons use. To this end, the work of the Fact-Finding Mission in Syria (FFM) and the Investigation and Identification Team (IIT) remain pivotal. We encourage the two bodies to carry out their mandate independently and with transparency.

We acknowledge the FFM report of 24th January, 2022, regarding incidents of alleged use of chemical weapons in Marea on 1st and 3rd September 2015 as well as the report of 31st January, 2022, on alleged incidents that occurred in Kafr Zeita on 1 October 2016.

Finally, it is our belief that the expeditious closure of investigations into the use of chemical weapons in Syria will allow this Council to support the Syrian people more meaningfully in their quest for a comprehensive and lasting peace. I thank you for your kind attention.